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3Abstract
New entrants very often spin out from established firms and because they set on a course at
founding, their learning and capabilities become inextricably linked to their organizational and
technological heritage. But while this heritage may provide an initial advantage, it can also
generate inertia and resistance to change, unless the new company is able to unlearn some
practices from the parent company and learn something new in order to establish its own sources
of competitive uniqueness. This tension between inherited path and new trajectory, imprinted
past and search for newness is the object of this paper. Building on an in depth case study of
Acorn Computers and ARM semiconductors we show that while there are strong influences from
the parent company on the spinoff, these imprinted organizational effects can be overridden. We
use the term deprinting to stress the reversible nature of this process in contrast with the
irreversibility embodied by the classic imprinting notion. This is followed by a phase of intense
learning efforts whereby the spinoff establishes its competitive identity based on a blending of
retained routines, repeated improvisation and feedbacks from the market. We refer to this process
with the term reimprinting, to emphasize the metamorphosis experienced by the spinoff as it sets
on a new distinctive trajectory.
41. INTRODUCTION
There is considerable evidence indicating that some of the most radically innovative products and
technologies are often developed and commercialized not by incumbent companies, but rather by
entrepreneurial ventures. However, contrary to the popular image of solitary entrepreneurs
starting from scratch and seizing venturing opportunities, many of these ventures trace their
origin back to pre-existing incumbent firms or academic institutions (Christensen, 1993; Klepper,
2001; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). These ventures are usually referred to as spin-offs that is,
entrants founded by employees of established organizations in the same industry.
In this literature, spin-offs represent a distinctive class of industry entrants that have a clear
parental heritage (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). Because spin-offs are incubated within an
organizational setting with established routines, practices, and culture, their learning trajectory
and capabilities become profoundly intertwined with those of their parents’. Spin-offs may
inherit from their parent companies blueprints and models in the form of established routines,
technologies and capabilities that are likely to shape not only the founding process of the new
venture but its long term behavior and success, thus leaving a lasting stamp on its development
(Agarwal et al., 2004).
In recent years an increasing number of studies have drawn on biological analogies to
describe the parent company and its influence on its progeny (spin-off) as a form of imprinting
(Stinchcombe, 1965). The fate of the spin-off is held to be determined by the conditions at
founding and the characteristics of the genetic heritage received by birthright. This aura of
inevitability is not surprising given that the primal inspiration for theories on organizational
imprinting is to be found in the seminal work by Konrad Lorenz (1970), who argued that once
developed, imprinting is irreversible1. But just as organisms are not clones of any of their parents,
spinoffs also differ from their parents. Spinoffs need to deviate from their parents’ trajectory to
establish their sources of uniqueness and succeed2 (Klepper 2006). This tension between
inherited path and new trajectory, imprinted past and search for newness is the object of this
paper. How do spinoffs come to grip with their past in order to build their future?   How does the
                                                 
1 For instance, if a bird was imprinted to a bird of another species, later contact with its own species would not
eliminate effects of early experience.
2 Pushing the evolutionary metaphor further, more fit members of the species – industry - have higher rates of
reproduction, which bears on the fitness of the entire species (Klepper, 2006).
5inherited resources and capabilities become combined in order for the spin-off to establish its
own idiosyncratic advantage? While this organizational heritage may provide an initial
advantage, it can also generate inertia and resistance to change, unless the new company is able
to discard some practices from the parent company and experiment and learn something new,
more consistent with its own domain. How does such an internal selection process unfold? Can
the spin-off set itself free from its imprinted make-up?
Although there is much research linking incumbents’ initial conditions to their long-term
performance (Cockburn et al., 2000; Helfat and Lieberman 2002; Cattani, 2005, 2006; Winter et
al., 2006) only relatively few studies have extended this approach to the parent-progeny dyad
(Phillips, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) so as to investigate the extent to
which the imprinting phenomenon may unfold through experience of the progeny and materialize
in the form of a long-term competitive advantage. However, because most of these studies place a
predominant emphasis on the continuity that shapes the relationship between spin-offs and their
parent, very little is known about the critical juncture when the offspring deviates from its
parent’s trajectory to establish its own competitive identity. While in this stream of research it is
generally conjectured that entrepreneurial offspring may inherit routines and key resources from
their parent organizations, we lack a micro-founded understanding of the organizational
conditions under which such processes occur and a clear specification of the actual practices that
are the object of such intergenerational transfer. For instance, in a study among Silicon Valley
law firms by Phillips (2002) the transfer of capabilities and resources from parent to progeny is
inferred from evidence on the migration of employees across organizations. It is however unclear
precisely which (and to what extent) blueprints are retained and which are released in the process.
As a result little is known on what exactly the progeny is inheriting from its parent and the extent
to which it does actually exploit such legacy.
To address these themes we followed a longitudinal case study design across two
organizational settings, that of Acorn Computers (the parent company) and ARM (the spin-off).
In the early ‘80s Acorn Computers was one of the most successful of pioneering UK technology
enterprises. However in 1984 it ran into serious difficulties and was taken over by Olivetti. Acorn
had (before takeover) started developing in-house know-how which would enable the company to
be more self sufficient. The capability originating within Acorn later formed the basis for a 1990
6spin-off, Advanced Risk Machine (ARM), which developed billion dollar assets and became the
worldwide leader in low power consumption RISC based processor technologies. Based on prior
literature and our initial observations we developed a preliminary conceptual framework, which
we applied to detailed case evidence. The evidence leaded us to refine our initial conceptual
framework to take into account the subtleties of the evidence uncovered.
The paper is organized as follows.  We begin by looking at prior work and compare this
with our initial observations. On this basis we construct a preliminary conceptual framework. We
then present the methods summarizing the research design, the setting, and the data. We go on to
focus on the case evidence to illustrate how ARM capitalized on its organizational heredity while
at the same time departing from the practices of its parent, Acorn. Next we interpolate extant
theory with key insights from the case evidence and abstract our revised model of parent-progeny
transfer and spin-off entry. We conclude by discussing the implications and the limitations of this
study and identify important topics for future research.
2. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUALIZATION
Our approach to theory building in this paper involves iteration between conceptualization and
evidence in a variant of Eisenhardt’s case methodology (1989). The concepts we developed on
the basis of preliminary observation and literature review guided us towards relevant case
material. Once we had assembled detailed case evidence, anomalous findings that were not
addressed by our original conceptualization called for re-examination of our conjectures. This led
to a refined conceptualization, supporting greater depth and richness of interpretation.
In the simplest terms, we started by questioning the concept that imprinting is irreversible,
conjecturing that reflexive agents may critically revise their organizational  inheritance  as Popper
had argued in the case of human agents (Popper 1965). This process is effectuated in order to
filter out unwanted practices and routines and retain only those that are more consistent with their
new objectives and the demands of the progeny’s market environment.  In delineating our
perspective on intergenerational learning we build upon a body of knowledge that combines
literature on organizational founding conditions with ideas on the role of individual agency and
deliberate learning in shaping the trajectories of spin-off firms. Taken together, these strands of
7literature offer original angles from which to appreciate the learning processes associated with the
spawning of new firms from parent organizations.
In the following section we distil key ideas and observations from the literature and suggest
a preliminary conceptualization of parent progeny influence and spin-off entry. Next we present
our case history and analysis thereof.
2.1. Parent-progeny imprinting and spin-off entry: A stylized model
Research on organizational imprinting provides empirical evidence of the formative influence of
early choices, as well as some explanation of the processes that generate persistence. This
literature holds that over time imprinted organizations become increasingly committed to early
strategies, reinvesting their resources in employees with consonant skills, building sets of norms,
practices and routines that promote the original vision, and refining policies to support the goals
arising from their original strategies. Two main factors shape the imprinted organization: the
initial conditions (Stinchcombe 1965) and the founders (Kimberly 1979; Schein 1983; Boeker
1988).
While the original imprinting hypothesis of Stinchcombe (1965) was mainly concerned
with wider institutional and societal founding conditions as carriers of lasting influence, at a more
micro-level of analysis the founding contexts of a majority of new ventures is represented by
other firms. These new firms, usually referred to as spin-offs, trace their initial founding
conditions to incumbent firms where they typically undergo a gestation period before entering the
market. Spin-offs are legion in various high-technology industries such as semi-conductor (Braun
& MacDonald, 1978), disk drive (Christensen, 1993), and laser (Klepper & Sleeper, 2000), as
well as in the legal services (Phillips, 2002). Because the initial conditions of spin-offs - the
“available social technology” (Stinchcombe 1965) - can be traced to other firms, and because
“what an organization knows at its birth will determine what it searches for, what it experiences
and how it interprets what it encounter” (Huber 1991, p. 91), the imprinting process suggests that
spin-offs’ early choices and strategies will become tightly intertwined with their parent’s
trajectory. Knowledge, culture and routines embodied in the organizational context of the
spawning company imprint the spin-off’s organizations, affecting its developmental course and
leading to continuity in strategy and culture already developed at the parent level.
8Initial organizational and strategic conditions, however, are not the only source of parent-
progeny persistency for spin-off firms. Another source of continuity is the influence of
employees who exit the parent company to found the progeny, carrying with them previously
accumulated experience and know-how (Klepper and Thompson, 2006). Founders are highly
consequential in setting the course of a new firm because of the way their experience, cognitions
and beliefs, shape a firm’s orientations (Boeker 1988). But in the case of spin-offs such biases
and mental models are likely to be the result of experience that matured within the parent
company. In fact, when employees leave a parent organization to found a new spin-off venture,
they walk out with blueprints in the form of tacit knowledge, routines, and heuristics. As
suggested by Agarwal et al (1994): “Very much like the inheritance of biological genes (Winter
1991), organizational blueprints consisting of unique insights and decision rules used to
transform resources into action, cognitive dimensions of competency (Fiol 1991), specific
knowledge and information (Boeker 1997), can all be transferred through founders from parents
to progenies”.
Thus, whether it unfolds through imprinting via initial conditions, or employees
transferring blueprints and rules of actions, the parent-progeny relationship suggests a strong
entanglement between the competitive trajectory of the spawning firm and its spin-off. In either
case, according to the imprinting literature, early choices at the parent level are likely to persist in
the progeny because changing course is costly and investments are difficult to reverse, early
practices quickly become taken for granted, and choices are elaborated into interconnected
systems (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990). As noted by Argawal et al. (2004), because the
spin-off is set on a course at founding, its learning capabilities and performance “become
inextricably linked to their organizational and technological heritage”.
Figure one provides an appreciative representation of the parent-progeny influence model
that can be distilled from this literature. The figure summarizes the two imprinting influences that
shape the spin-off formation. The initial conditions’ imprinting is embedded in the organizational
environment of the spawning firm; the founders’ imprinting is embodied by the employees that
move across organizational domains. Together these two imprinting forces may leave a lasting
impression on the spin-off, engendering persistence in the competitive and technological
trajectory from parent to progeny.
9Figure 1 here
This stylized characterization of the entry of spin-offs and their subsequent trajectory as being
strongly pre-influenced by conditions that ensue at the level of the spawning incumbent is aligned
with evidence building up on spin-off entry and performance. For instance, in Klepper and
Sleeper’s study on the laser industry, it is shown that nearly all the spin-offs initially produce a
type of laser their parent had produced, thus suggesting that spin-offs exploited competencies
inherited from their parents. Using evidence from the disk drive sector Agarwal et al. (2004)
demonstrate that both technological and marketing know-how can be passed from parent to
progeny. In a study of Silicon Valley’s law firms Phillips illustrates how personnel outflows
increase similarity of routines and resources across organizations (Phillips 2002) and, by
implication, their competitive interdependence. Using a comprehensive dataset of Danish start-
ups Dahl and Reichenstein (2006) similarly suggest that spin-offs whose founders have a long
tenure with the spawning firms are more likely to replicate and adapt blueprints established at the
parent’s level. Gompers et al. (2005) also shows that spin-offs use knowledge and practices
developed in the parent firm to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.
Research on imprinting and the related evidence on parent-progeny interorganizational
relationships have provided rich support for the idea that critical knowledge and routines may be
imprinted on spin-offs at birth and that this legacy is central to the understanding of the strategic
course and success of spin-offs. But while this evidence is persuasive in demonstrating the
continuity that underlies this relationship, it falls short in explaining whether and how, at some
stage, the spin-off will reshape its imprinted trajectory and develop its own sources of
distinctiveness and competitive identity. In fact, most of this literature appears to be premised on
an untested assumption that the interorganizational heritage is imprinted somehow irreversibly in
the offspring, thus resulting in a strong causal relationship between the quality of the parent
company and the survival of the progeny.  So, for instance, it is assumed that “healthy” parents
are more likely to spawn smart progeny (Agarwal et al. 2005, p. 505). Because spin-offs from
successful parents are more likely to inherit fit routines it is argued that they will perform better
than other spin-offs, and other start-ups. As noted by Dahl and Reichenstein (2005): “Spin-offs
with better performing parents are based on better routines, which positively increases their
chances of survival”. Along a similar line, it is suggested that offspring from failing parent
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organizations should be less likely to succeed due to inheritance of faulty routines and inadequate
resources. As expressed by Phillips (2002): “progeny that arose in the wake of their parents’
failure were more likely to fail […] rather than benefiting from the failure of the parent law firms,
progeny assume the same resources and routines that led to the failure of their parents”.
This deterministic depiction of spin-off entry and performance based on parental imprinting
raises several issues.  First, if the imprinted influences were as enduring and consequential as this
literature seems to imply, spin-offs which are very different from their parents or on a very
different strategic path would not be in evidence, or if they were,  as the exception rather than the
norm. Nor should we expect to observe highly successful offspring originating from failing
incumbents, as this would not be consistent with the irreversible nature of imprinting. However
there is also contrary evidence. Swaminathan (1996), for instance, shows that organizations
founded in adverse environmental conditions will have high initial mortality rate but higher
survival at a later stage. The study does not distinguish the founding context based on whether or
not the firms are spin-off or start-ups, yet it does suggest that unfavorable initial conditions may
give rise to high performance firms (the fittest firms are likely to be those forged under
unfavorable initial conditions). Other studies indicate that spin-off entry is often triggered by
internal conflicts and disagreement (Klepper and Thompson 2006), thus suggesting some kind of
departure or rupture from the parent’s path. ‘Fairchild semiconductors’, for example, was a
sinking ship when it spawned some of the firms (sometimes known as the Fairchildren) that
would establish the foundations for Silicon Valley and lead the semiconductor industry to new
glory.
These observations suggest that the irreversibility of imprinting may have been overstated
and point to a series of questions that extant theory on parent-progeny heritage and spin-off entry
does not seem able to fully account for: What is the relationship between spin-offs’ evolutionary
trajectory and imprinted influences ? What processes and conditions shape the critical juncture
when the spin-off departs from the parent company to establish its own competitive identity?
How do spin-offs evolve their own capabilities while at the same time building on experience in
the parent company ?
3. METHODS
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3.1. Research setting
Our research questions suggest a topic in need of theory building, prior to hypothesis being
framed or test. Case research based on in depth evidence is a suitable method for studying
processes that span long periods and under-researched complex phenomenon (Eisenhardt 1989).
The method requires rich field data and using the research questions to guide data collection and
iterative refinement of initial concepts. In developing theory, the richness of data used is more
important than the number of cases.  Using an extensive archive of interview, internal documents,
newspaper articles and other secondary sources on Acorn Computers (parent) and its spin-off
ARM (progeny), we wrote a comprehensive case of parent-progeny transition spanning more
than two decades.  We generalize from a  set of key events in the case to develop process theory
explanations and revise our initial model accordingly (Van de Ven 1992).
Research setting
 Acorn Computers was one of the most successful of pioneering UK technology enterprises
Though Acorn itself was not a commercial success, it gave rise directly or indirectly to more than
thirty start-ups including ARM, just as Fairchild gave rise to Intel and other start-ups in Silicon
Valley. However in 1984 Acorn ran into serious difficulties and was taken over by Olivetti.
Among the reasons for Acorn’s problems were the delays and defects in the microprocessors
supplied by Ferranti. Acorn therefore started developing in-house know-how which would enable
the company to be more self sufficient. The technology and capability originating within Acorn
then formed the basis for a 1990 spin-off, Advanced Risk Machine (ARM), which established
itself as a world leader in semiconductor IP and became a major success story.
We chose Acorn and ARM as the field for our inquiry for several reasons. First, Acorn and
ARM represent a unique occurrence in the history of European high tech industry. Acorn is
probably unequalled in spawning new high tech ventures in the U.K. while ARM is the most
prominent European company in microprocessors design and worldwide leader in low power
consumption RISC based processor technologies. Given its long history as a highly innovative
and R&D-oriented company as well as a breeding ground for new ventures, Acorn represented a
fruitful context for evaluating the impact of a firm’s existing knowledge base on spin-off
emergence. We needed a case for which we could track key processes in parent-progeny
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transition as accurately as possible without it being too old to prevent us from interviewing
people who were directly involved in the transition. Finally, due to the success of Acorn during
the eighties and the subsequent dramatic take-off of ARM in the nineties (despite the parent
company decline), both Acorn and ARM have received extensive media coverage throughout the
last two decades. This has generated a large amount of secondary data that we could use in the
analysis to complement the data we collected during our interviews.
3.2. Research Design
The study was based on a longitudinal case study design across two organizational settings (Yin,
1994). We collected both interview and archival data on the origins of the two companies and the
transition from one to the other. We began by writing short case studies of the two organizations,
updating the cases based on our successive interviews. We gathered data primarily through semi-
structured interviews of key personnel involved in the transition process and engineers
responsible for developing RISC technology in ARM. Throughout this phase we built on
findings, evidence and sources accumulated over almost 20 years by the first author on Acorn
and ARM, as part of a research project aimed at investigating issues of new firms growth and
technology management (Fleck and Garnsey, 1987; Garnsey, 1999; 2002; 2004; Garnsey and
Fleck, 1988).
Acorn was first approached in 1986 by the first author, when the aim was to understand
the origin and evolution of the company. A second group of interviews was conducted in 2001,
following the spawning of ARM. Finally key people from both organizations were contacted
again and interviewed in 2005 and 2006, in order to clarify data patterns and processes that
emerged from the analysis of the accumulated evidence. This abundance of sources, the repetition
of key interviews over subsequent time points and more generally the opportunity of tracking the
events as they unfolded over time helped us reduce the risk of our retrospectively imposing
meaning on historical events from our knowledge of outcomes (Aldrich, 2000).
3.3. Data Collection
All the authors performed data analysis. Our analysis followed an iterative process of moving
back and forth between our emerging framework for assessing the process of spin-off entry,
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theory on parent-progeny transfer, and our growing body of data. For Acorn, data and interviews
gathered during the ‘80s and ‘90s were combined with historical sources, the company having
ceased to exist in 1999. For ARM retrospective data were combined with current information
collected during the research.
3.3.1. Personal interviews
We interviewed people at multiple levels, some of them on multiple occasions. Informants were
selected among key contributors to Acorn and ARM. They were individuals from different
functional areas who made crucial decisions and critically shaped the genesis and development of
the two companies. Some of them only contributed to Acorn or ARM while others where directly
involved throughout the gestation and spawning event. Taken together they represented a wide
range of expertise, training, and experience within the two companies. Since the interviewees
were present at different times and moments in Acorn’s-ARM history, we could reconstruct more
accurately how the parent-progeny influence process unfolded (for a similar approach, see
Cattani, 2004).
We conducted open-ended interviews with all informants. We asked them different
questions depending on their role and degree of involvement in the spin-off. Our goal during
these encounters was threefold: First, we were interested in understanding the knowledge
conditions conducive to the creation of a new company. We thus asked informants questions
about the general context in which research was conducted and knowledge managed inside
Acorn. These questions helped us characterize the internal “selection environment” at Acorn.
Second, we were interested in tracking the origins of the entrepreneurial opportunity leading to
the foundation of ARM. Accordingly, our second set of questions dealt more specifically with
“how’’ the RISC3 technology was encountered and the choices that were made in order to pursue
it. We sought to understand the motives behind the spin-off decision and the links between such
motives and the competencies Acorn had been developing over time. How well did the stock of
available skills and knowledge match the requirements of the RISC opportunity? Was Acorn
deliberately promoting the spin-out of ARM as a means for better exploiting the RISC
                                                 
3 A Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) chip is a microprocessor that is designed to perform only the most common types
of computer instructions, so that it can operate at a higher speed. By using only the most common instructions, RISC chips can
perform the majority of tasks more efficiently.
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opportunity? Was it aware of its potential? Third, we wanted to identify ARM’s inheritance from
Acorn and its offspring. To this end we asked informants to identify the key traits of the ARM
business model and technological base and to reflect on the role of initial conditions and
antecedents in shaping the spin-off entry process and the competitive behavior of ARM.
To delve deeper into key issues, the interviewers followed up on responses with questions
such as: Could you elaborate further on this aspect? Would you add something else to the
picture? Are there any other questions you think we should have asked?
3.3.2. Archival data
We need secondary sources from research literature and internal documents on Acorn and ARM.
Additional data were obtained from industry publications, financial analysts’ reports, and press
reports about Acorn and ARM.  Other sources provided background information on the role of
Olivetti in rescuing Acorn from the financial crisis that had befallen the company in the mid ‘80s
(Ciborra, 1994; Piol, 2005) on the career histories of Hermann Houser and Robin Saxby, founder
of Acorn and CEO of ARM respectively (Langdon and Manners, 2001) and on the technological
transition that marked ARM as providing the leading architecture in the low power consumption
embedded  processors (Atack and van Someren, 1993).
These sources helped us to clarify the internal as well as environmental conditions under
which the Acorn-ARM transition took place. We used these sources to cross check interview data
and control for biases in retrospective accounts of past events. Wherever incongruity between
secondary sources and interview data emerged we were challenged to rethink of our
conceptualizations and revise our questions. This variety of data sources provided a basis for
triangulation and may alleviate some of the concerns associated with retrospective data
(Burgelman, 1994; Golden, 1992). Indeed, the crucial benefit of using several sources of
evidence is the development of “converging lines of inquiry’’ (Yin, 1994: 92).
4. FINDINGS
The analysis of the data suggested that the transition from Acorn to ARM and the key events and
decisions underlying the parent-progeny transfer could be understood in terms of three sequential
phases. (In phase one the parent company develops its own distinctive traits and capabilities. The
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culture, practices and routines that crystallize during this phase set the initial conditions under
which the progeny is to emerge. Phase two is the gestation period that culminates with the
spawning of the new firm. This is the phase of congenital learning and inheritance. The spin-off
draws on parent’s lessons to make sense of the external environment and rapidly set on a
developmental course. Yet, this is can also be a phase of rebellion as the offspring tries to
develop its own identity and override its imprinted parental influences. We suggest that such
impetus towards deviation increases to the extent that the parent experienced severe failures or
crises. Negative events may indeed serve as powerful stimuli for the progeny to critically revise
its heritage. We characterize this second phase with the term deprinting, to stress the reversible
nature of this process in contrast with the irreversibility embodied by the classic imprinting
notion. The deprinting phase is followed by a third phase of intense learning efforts whereby the
spin-off establishes its competitive identity based on a blending of retained routines, repeated
improvisation and feedbacks from the market. We refer to this third phase with the term
reimprinting, to emphasize the metamorphosis experienced by the spin-off as it departs from the
parent’s path and sets on a new distinctive trajectory.)
These transition phases roughly reflect three key periods in the Acorn-ARM transition.
The first period (1978 – 1985), coincides with the initial years at Acorn, when the company
accumulated technical know-how and establishes an organizational culture strongly dedicated to
technical excellence. In this period Acorn first came across the RISC opportunity and started to
probe and learn about its potential. During the second period (1986 - 1990), corresponding to the
deprinting phase, conditions emerged at Acorn that led to the decision to spin out the new
technology and found ARM. ARM inherited from its parent the RISC technology together with
distinctive cultural traits and complementary resources, yet the crisis looming large at Acorn and
the arrival of new external investors also triggered the unlearning of inappropriate practices from
the parent company and new efforts to learn what is more consistent with the new emerging
strategic agenda of the founding team. During the third period (post 1990), ARM’s technological
know-how in Reduced Instruction Set processors is combined with the competencies of a new
CEO coming from a different environment and with strong marketing experience. This
combination of continuity with new drive (reimprinting) shaped the emergence of a radically new
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intellectual property and partnership-based business model business model that fueled new
investments and innovations, and set the spin-off on a highly idiosyncratic competitive track.
4.1. Phase one: The rise of Acorn Computers. Founding conditions and imprinting
In 1978 Herman Hauser, a PhD in Physics at Cambridge University, founded CPU limited
together with Chris Curry. He and Chris Curry founded CPU to pursue the opportunity they could
see opening up for a low cost micro-computer that would be very powerful by the standards of
the time. Hermann knew how to find the people who could design a high performance machine
that could be sold at a price reflecting low overheads while Chris Curry during his years at
Sinclair had learned the benefits to a start-up company on the mail order model which required
minimal capital. The novice entrepreneurs invested only £100 in their new company and in 1979,
using the income from its design-and-build consultancy CPU, financed the development of a
6502-based microcomputer system. This system was launched in January 1979 as the first
product of Acorn Computer Ltd, a trading name used by CPU to keep the risks of the two
different lines of business separate.
Acorn was at the forefront of micro-computer ideas because it was able to tap expertise
from the Computer Lab of the University of Cambridge. Hermann's persuasive skills were soon
apparent. As Hauser recalls:
“They called me a ‘Hoover of Talent’ – I used to go out to the University Microprocessor Group and
find out who were the smartest designers and hire them to design our computers. So really, right
from the start I was the person who articulated the vision and found exceptionally talented people to
do the design. And they were outstanding designs” (Langdon and Manners 2001 p. 112).
Knowing that they were at the leading edge technically gave Acorn the confidence to
compete with better resourced rivals like Commodore and Apple.
In 1981 Acorn was placed on the list of companies invited to tender for a BBC contract
which would allow the selected computer to carry the BBC emblem in return for royalties. There
was a visit from the BBC at the start of a week to look at their designs which were viewed as
promising.  Hauser succeeded in persuading a group including chief engineers Roger Wilson and
Steve Furber, to build a working prototype in four days, in time for the next meeting about the
BBC contract. He says he did this by telling each of the team that the others thought this was
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possible. Together they achieved what they individually thought to be impossible. As recalled by
Steve Furber:
“I built the first prototype by hand and Sophie looked at it and said ‘I could do better than that!’ and
went away and did so. I thought the System 1 was entirely designed over an Easter vacation…. I do
recall that Sophie produced the monitor program by hand (hand assembly of 6502 code), we blew it
into a PROM and it worked straight off. There may have been a minor bag or two but basically it run
first run, previously untested”.
The favorable report of the BBC's technical advisors and energy of the young team with its
strong university connections led the BBC group to select Acorn's prototype as the demonstration
model for their computer literacy series.  The still precarious new venture was now endorsed by
the BBC, and with this came brave new prospects. Acorn's reputation grew with their innovative
R&D and high quality standards. New product design and development were a priority.
Creativity was viewed as a strategic need, the view being that a leading company had to be ahead
of its rivals on as many fronts as possible. Hauser enthusiasm for ideas helped give Acorn the
buzz of a leading research lab. In the early 1980's the company was developing products which
were very new at the time but to become familiar ideas ten years later, including modems, other
telecommunications products for satellite  and cable broadcasting, interactive video and an
operating system to rival UNIX (The Guardian, March 8, 2001). Despite Acorn’s eagerness for
technical excellence, it became soon apparent that too many senior managers were more
interested in technology than in the day-to-day mechanics of running a business. By 1983 many
of these R&D projects were not relevant to Acorn's core business of microcomputers nor to well
identified market needs. Few developed into marketable products, and few of those produced sold
well. Yet, this propensity to experiment and innovate remained over the years a distinctive trait of
Acorn, turning it into an extraordinary forerunner of technological change. As one of the senior
engineers told us: “Acorn always did things that were challenging conventional way”
 In 1983 Acorn was growing fast and floated on the stock market. In order to maintain the
edge and prevent any further delays in the launch of the Archimedes, the next generation
computer, a group responsible for chip design was set up in late 1983 with the task of looking
around for new microprocessor designs to replace the existing 8 bit 6502. Yet, none of the
existing architecture seemed to fit with Acorn’s vision:
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“We looked at National’s 16032 and Motorola 680000 but they did not suit our design style. They
had very complicated instruction sets giving poor interrupt response. Basically they were too slow.”
(interview with Steve Furber)
At some stage Acorn also planned to use Intel's 286 chips in its Archimedes computer. But
because Intel would not let it license the 286 core and adapt it, Hauser eventually decided to give
the R&D group free rein (though no new resources) to stretch their expertise by creating their
own 16-bit chip for the Archimedes computer. At that time, starting from scratch to design a 16-
bit microprocessor “would simply appear insane to most of the people in the microprocessors business”
(Herman Hauser, interview)
Yet, the design team were enterprising enough to get themselves to the Western Design
Centre in Phoenix and discover that other small teams were designing their own chips using early
RISC techniques pioneered at AT&T.
“We knew that it had taken National 200 years of development time for the 16032 and Acorn could
not afford that – we only had 300 people at the time”, recalls Furber, “then we came across the
Berkeley RISC.4 A group of graduate students had built a microprocessor with only a tiny
percentage of the resources used by National. It was simple, it addressed the interrupt problem and it
seemed something worth looking at”.
One again Acorn proved it could match up to extraordinary technical challenges and create
new competencies from scratch.
“The general view was that microprocessors had a mystique - that they were designed by very
special people. I'd never designed a microprocessor and everything I knew about computers I'd
learned at the Cambridge University Processor Group where people met to make computers for
fun…but we were confident […] Our mentality was let's have a go at building a microprocessor"
(Steve Furber, quoted on …)
So, whereas at IBM were simulating RISC instruction sets on powerful mainframe
computers, at Acorn, Steve Furber, Sophie Wilson and their small team of engineers managed to
designed a RISC chip using their own brain power. Having limited resources and a limited group
of people they succeeded in coming up with a highly efficient architecture which capitalized
ingeniously on their previous core technology. As explained by one of the engineers in the
original team
                                                 
4 A Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) chip is a microprocessor that is designed to perform only the most common types
of computer instructions, so that it can operate at a higher speed. By using only the most common instructions, RISC chips can
perform the majority of tasks more efficiently.
19
“One of the reasons it is very low power is that we had no idea how to do it … We wanted it to go
into a plastic package because that’s much cheaper than a ceramic package and there were power
limits so we did everything we could to minimize power. Not because we had this far sighted view
that we’re going to be the portable products of the future.  It was small because we kept it simple. It
was essentially reusable because we were a very small design team with no resources and we had to
reuse our own core design”.
The Acorn RISC Machine (ARM) was designed in 18 months by the same people who worked
on the first computer and the pattern was the same; it worked sufficiently well the first time to be
debugged using the system itself. The chip had 30,000 transistors that is, the same number as a
Z80 or the 6502 that Acorn used in its BBC Micros, but it was twenty times faster and it had
exceptionally good power consumption. It was also the world’s first RISC processor. According
to Hauser
“ARM was part of a policy decision that a computer should be deigned on silicon rather than
cobbled together out of third party components. This focus made Acorn one of a small, select group
of genuine computer companies (Apple being the most obvious) that own their own technology from
the ground”.
Indeed, having learned how to build an entire computer system from scratch Acorn had generated
know-how in all computer specialties, including among others, silicon chip design, operating
system design, computer architecture and local area networking.  ARM’s first sample was
delivered in 1985 and was manufactured by VLSI which also gained the right to sell chips using
Acorn’s new chip design.
The ARM microprocessor emerged in a period when Acorn was experiencing financial
difficulties. The main problem for Acorn since its inception had been increasing output to meet
demand. The Electron had been launched in 1983 but problems with the supply of its ULAs
meant that Acorn was not able to capitalize on the 1983 Christmas selling period – a successful
advertising campaign, including TV advertisements, had led to 300,000 orders but the suppliers
were only able  to supply 30,000 machines. The apparently strong demand for Electrons proved
to be illusory: rather than wait, parents bought Commodore 64s or Sinclair Spectrums for their
children's presents. Ferranti solved the production problem and in 1984 production reached its
anticipated volumes, but the contracts Acorn had negotiated with its suppliers were not flexible
enough to allow volumes to be reduced quickly in this (unanticipated) situation – supplies of the
Electron built up. By the end of the year Acorn had 250,000 unsold Electrons on its hands, which
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had all been paid for and needed to be stored – at additional expense. Acorn was also spending a
large portion of its reserves on research and development.  The BBC Master was being
developed; the ARM project was underway; the Acorn Business Computer entailed considerable
development work but ultimately proved to be something of a flop, with only one version ever
being sold.  Obtaining Federal approval for the BBC Micro in order to expand into the United
States proved to be an ultimately unsuccessful drawn-out and expensive process.  The expansion
devices that were intended to be sold with the BBC Micro had to be tested and radiation
emissions had to be reduced.) Around $20m was sunk into the US operation but the NTSC
modified BBC Micros sold barely at all. By January 1985 one third of the Christmas stock
remained unsold; sales were about 35% below the April forecast and the pressures on Acorn
made it necessary to cut staff numbers from 450 to 250 by early in 1985. Suppliers' demands for
payment became pressing and by early February 1985 a winding up petition was issued.  Acorn
had to cease trading.
4.2. Phase II: The crisis of Acorn and the spin-off decision. Deprinting and learning shift.
Unexpectedly, when Acorn was about to cease operations and no British company seemed to be
willing to enter into an arrangement with Acorn, Elserino Piol from Olivetti made an approach.
On 20 February 1985, after a short period of negotiations, Curry and Hauser signed an agreement
with Olivetti giving the Italian computer company a 49.3% stake in Acorn for £12 million. The
money went some way to covering Acorn's £11 million losses in the previous six months. Sales
targets were agreed, which depended on Olivetti distributors selling Acorn stock. This did not
occur. (Distributors were attributing the fall in sales of Acorn computers to their proprietary
operating system which was not compatible with the emerging industry standard, DOS.  When
Bill Gates had offered a license on favorable terms, Hauser had rejected the idea of moving to an
inferior operating system.) As a result, sales targets were missed over the summer of 1985, and a
second round of refinancing was eventually implemented. In September 1985, Olivetti took
ownership of 79% of Acorn.  They paid under £15m for the company, which had been valued at
£100m in the previous year.
Olivetti had acquired an R&D team which was at the forefront of developments in
operating systems, microchip developments and user-interface. Major projects underway
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included development work on the still novel RISC chip technology, a new micro-computer
operating system with wide applications and interactive video development. “In accordance with
Olivetti's partnering policies, Acorn had originally been acquired to gain market share in the UK
and a strong foothold in the education market. After the acquisition, both of these objectives lost
their importance because of the very troubled financial situation of the company.   However, it
came as a surprise that Acorn's labs contained a wealth of people, skills and on-going projects
that turned out to be of strategic relevance, putting the company (Olivetti) on a new track, at least
as far as corporate R&D was concerned; more precisely, they envisioned for Olivetti the option to
be a world leader in workstation technology instead of just being a follower of IBM (Ciborra
1994)
Before leaving the company, the founders had appointed a managing director facing the
new task of integration after the acquisition.  The key issue in Acorn was to realize a transition
from an independent company into a subsidiary and benefit from Olivetti’s international access
and resources. Yet, Olivetti's own financial performance in 1987 was disappointing and pressures
on Acorn to keep out of the red increased. The timing was bad:  capital investment was urgently
required for the launch of Acorn’s new personal computer, and for development of a UNIX
workstation designed as competition for the highly successful SUN Microsystems product. In
1988 Olivetti started pursuing several avenues to sell ARM’s core technology:
“The first option was to sell it internally but Olivetti was already using Intel; then we tried to sell it
to ST Microelectronics, but they were already linked to another chip manufacturer, then we
approached Siemens, but they became skeptical because we were using Intel rather than ARM, at
some stage we also approached Lerry Ellison but he declined too” (Elserino Piol, personal
interview).
By late ‘80s it became clear that the great potential of the ARM micro-processor was being
stifled within Acorn and that the liaison with Olivetti product planning branches was not
forthcoming. At the same time most computer companies were unwilling to buy a microprocessor
that was owned by a competitor.  As observed by one of the top managers at Acorn:
“We had lots of go’s at spinning out the technology and selling it to others, but none of these had
worked. In 1990 we were feeling pretty demoralized and had become used to failure. We were
downtrodden.”
In that period Apple was defining a new architecture for handheld devices, known as
“Newton”, and densing the first products to feature this new hardware and software architecture.
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Apple believed there would be a market for the “personal digital assistant” (PDA) amongst the
traveling business community. Having concluded that the ARM chip design was powerful
enough to be portable, the Apple vice president of Advanced Projects Group, Larry Tesler, then
played a key role in initiating the launch of an independent company to develop the full potential
of the ARM technology. John Stockton at VLSI Technology was also instrumental in initiating
ARM’s foundation. VLSI had licensed the first designs from Acorn and could see the potential to
extend their applications. However Acorn, as a primarily computer manufacturer, had little
incentive to provide wider support for the technology. After intensive interaction by Acorn
managers and Board members, backing for the decision to spin off ARM in 1990 was obtained
from Olivetti. A joint venture was undertaken with VSLI and Apple Computers. The new
company was now free to fully leverage the extensive expertise it had inherited from Acorn,
where the market potential of the RISC microprocessor was inhibited by the many organizational
and competitive pressures Acorn was subjected to. As managing director Sam Wauchope
explained in the wake of the spin off decision:
“It is a bit of a wrench to separate what has been an integral part of Acorn, but we have decided that
ARM and Acorn are best served by the creation of a separate company. The deal opens up many
possibilities in terms of product development which we probably would not have been able to
afford.”
The bulk of the Advanced Research and Development section of Acorn that had been
developing the ARM CPU for seven years and was composed of 12 engineers formed the basis of
ARM Ltd when that company was spun off in November 1990. From the outset, ARM inherited a
precise business model template that it could follow, as well as the technical expertise required to
design the processor. Acorn and Apple were the clients, and VLSI provided the manufacturing
capability. The initial business idea was to replicate externally what they had been doing for
Acorn before spinning out. They were now free to approach other computer manufacturers, who
could implement the ARM core without the fear of using a component controlled by a competitor
who could block them out. While this seemed the logical and easiest avenue to pursue, ARM had
also learned important lessons from the mistakes that led to the downfall of Acorn.  These
suggested the need for a critical revision of strategic direction. Acorn’s major problems had
always been production volume and lack of market focus. The proliferation of promising research
projects with no market follow through had demonstrated the crucial importance of establishing
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tight links with customers and listening to their needs before venturing into costly explorations.
Moreover, Acorn had made the mistake of maintaining an essentially inward looking strategic
stance, insisting on proprietary systems when it was becoming apparent that in order to compete
successfully in the computer industry firms had to aim for compatibility and open standards.
Attempts at exporting had been unsuccessful.  As ARM’s CEO noted:
“The lesson had been learnt from failures at Acorn that, in order to succeed, a product had to
succeed on the world stage and to do that, it had to become a global standard, which meant it had to
be used by many companies.” (Langdon and Manners, 2001 p. 121).
ARM’s learning process benefited from these lessons, which mapped very quickly onto a
radically new business model.
4.3. Setting on a new track: reimprinting and metamorphosis
With ARM established as a new company, the team set about recruiting a CEO with the right
skills. From his 12 years career with Motorola in the US and the Far East, Robin Saxby brought
new kinds of experience to ARM. In addition to a mix of technical and business expertise,
Saxby's infectious optimism also gave the new-born company high hopes. With significant
experience in the industry Saxby immediately sought to maximize the company’s very limited
resources. From his first involvement with ARM Robin Saxby recognized the importance of
managing relationships. Before accepting the job as managing director he arranged to meet the
twelve engineers from Acorn, who had come from different teams within Acorn,) to establish a
rapport with them. Within the company Saxby quickly developed an open culture. He played an
active part leading weekly management meetings and, right from the start, he involved everyone
in ARM in identifying its strengths and weaknesses.
In comparison to the US$2-3 billion capital investment that a silicon wafer factory requires,
ARM's resources were laughably modest. But although fabrication was clearly not an option,
there were other ways of entering the microprocessor market. Jamie Urquhart, one of the 12
founders, explained how he, Saxby and other two members of the early team made a SWOT
analysis that made the case for ARM (led towards) becoming an IP company:
“We got everyone into one room and reviewed the options. We had already successfully licensed
technology to VLSI. So we built on strengths we had. We also avoided weaknesses – no expertise in
the company in the backend product/shipping logistics required in a chip business.”
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Other companies had already taken the IP route by becoming “fabless” chip companies
contracting out the manufacture of their chips. ARM took this one step further and decided that
they would be a “chipless, chip company”. As a pure intellectual property firm, ARM would
license its chip designs to semiconductor companies. In this way partners would take the ARM
enabling technology, add their own application specific technology onto it, and use their silicon
plants to manufacture the chip. ARM’s declared goal was to become the global standard and
licenses were the only way for a small company with no resources. As explained by Saxby:
“To be the world standard, we had to get partners everywhere in parallel. And to get partners
everywhere in parallel, we had to license the technology. That’s the order of thinking”.
In order to pursue this strategy ARM had to develop new relational capabilities that were
not in the repertoire of its founders. Given the scarcity of resources, rather than recruiting
specialized marketing personnel Saxby chose to promote three of the twelve Acorn engineers to
positions of sales and marketing.  He believed that it was quicker and easier to teach engineers to
sell than teach salesmen to understand ARM's complex technology. Then he hired a part time
external consultant to train his team in sales and customer management. As one of the founders
told us:
This guy taught us the SPIN approach […] essentially the first thing you do with a customer is you
work out the Situation. How big is the company? How many chips do you design? How many chips
do you manufacture? Then the P is problems.  What sort of problems exists? Because getting a
customer to take your product, if there are no problems it is very difficult […]. And they had
problems because they had to design a different chip for every different application (it) goes into.
You then work by Implied Needs. If you can have one chip, you develop the theme of how you can
absolutely make the customer think and realize the cost of having to design lots of chips vs. the
benefit of having one chip that can do several things, saves a lot of money […] A number of people
went through that training and we were speaking a common language internally […] The main
lesson was listen to what’s going on […] listen to what’s happening in the market place,
understand it, don’t put your own interpretation on it, try to really understand what’s happening
[…] the culture was to learn and to understand, to assimilate and to see what works.
In November 1991 ARM launched its first products, the ARM6 family of chips including
the ARM600 power efficient microprocessor, at the Microprocessor forum in San Francisco
VLSI Technology offered to manufacture the new processors customized to users' requirements.
During this first year of operation, ARM focused on its immediate source of revenue from
licensing agreements. In January 1992, ARM announced that GEC Plessey Semiconductors
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(GPS) had become their first independent licensee to manufacture ARM chips and incorporate
ARM features into application-specific microcontrollers. ARM now had their first independent
partner with whom to work on the basis of the licensing model.  Indeed the relationship with
Plessey turned out to be ripe with learning opportunities. As a former Design Manager at Plessey
(now Principal Staff Engineer at ARM) explained:
“At Plessey we were looking around for a micro processing core and then […] we picked ARM […].
The thing that was different about ARM was that they were not just providing a core technology […].
They were also excellent listeners […] they were willing to learn because they knew we were on the
same boat. So they said to us, ‘We’ve got this core. It must be useful to people for something. We
don’t really know how you might want to use it but we’re prepared to work with you to understand
it.” And I think it was so refreshing from our point of view because, at the same time, we knew we
needed a core, and we didn’t know how to do it. We knew there were more questions that we knew
answers to but didn’t know what the questions were.  When ARM came to us and approached us, they
were in the exact same position. They had a capability, and they knew what they would like to do, but
they knew that there were so many questions that they knew answers to. And this made us a very
good fit because we were both going to learn out of this exercise. We were going to learn what a
CPU was and how to use it, and they were going to learn what it meant to be able to supply
something into an environment like Plessey They had this opportunity to work very closely with us, to
learn about modularizing an ARM, about using an ARM core in an ICs environment and we, at the
same time, were trying to understand how to sell this to our customers, how to put it into our product
offering […] We had to design products around it which was a very difficult thing to do. And we
learned. It was a teacher-student thing”
Saxby and his colleagues concentrated on the ‘brain’ side of the chip business”, and at the same
they made sure their company also benefited from a deep understanding of manufacturing
‘muscle’ by establishing a very strong, customer-oriented approach towards its licensees.
“We need to have an intimate understanding of the manufacturing process and work with our
partners in areas like test, de-bug, yield and performance enhancement […] We really treat our
customers as partners involving them in agreeing specifications and taking joint risk and benefit on
projects.”
Saxby also introduced a new business discipline to the group that had originated in an
unstructured environment as Acorn. As one of the founders stressed:
He (Saxby) can be very structured…So every year, we would have business plan. We would have
strategy review, an operational plan and a tactical plan. And these were not huge documents, but
they were important documents.  They were important in that they built on what we had been
learning. They aligned everybody in the right direction. They gave us focus and made us challenge
what we were doing.
This disciplined approach of focusing on maximizing available resources to deliver the
technology and nurture key relationships proved to be very effective as the small and fast moving
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ARM became self-sustaining by only its second year of operation, without the need for further
financing. In 1993 Sharp became the third licensee to manufacture and market ARM processors.
As experience increased, ARM offered further services to its clients such us consultancy,
feasibility studies, training and prototypes supply. The degree of learning and experience that
ARM was able to gain through these partners was dramatic.
In May 1993 when Texas Instruments took out a license. ARM’s business strategy as
independent chip designer was thus endorsed by another major player. After VLSI and Plessey,
this was the first licensee not signed through Apple’s contacts. TI pushed the boundaries of
ARM’s contractual discipline further and provided further inputs to its learning effort. :
TI imposed us new level of discipline. Contracts would contain all of the deliverables; they’d have all
of the timing specified. They were very professional and it was hard. They were demanding but they
taught us a great deal in terms of helping to regularize the set of deliverables that we would then
license on to our licensing partners (James Urquhart).
At the time TI was trying to win the mobile phone business of Nokia. Through TI had deep
expertise in one of the key technologies required, Digital Signal Processing (DSP), it was
relatively weak in the complementary technology for central processing units (CPUs). They
needed a CPU design that would work reliably in the background, use minimum power, and be
well supported with design tools, models and applications. Based on this platform, they could
focus on using their skills in DSP to make a chip that was uniquely attractive to Nokia. ARM’s
CPU technology promised to provide that platform, so TI decided to package the ARM design it
into its overall offer to Nokia. Nokia came back with a list of problems: the ARM processor
needed too much memory because the software code was too large, making it too expensive. But
Nokia also recognized that there wasn’t another product on the market that provided the required
performance and that the solutions to these problems weren’t obvious. ARM was breaking new
ground.
ARM took up the challenge. In response to Nokia’s feedback and an understanding of the
necessary interfaces with TI’s DSP technology, ARM worked with TI to set and then meet
ambitious targets for power consumption and code size. The outcome was an important,
significant innovation that became known as the “Thumb” architectural extension. By creating a
subset of the most commonly used 32-bit instructions; ARM’s engineers found they could
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compress these into smaller 16-bit code without any degradation in performance. Not only did
Thumb turn out to be very popular with ARM’s other partners, but the connection with Nokia
meant that ARM shared in Nokia’s success. The Thumb experience reinforced ARM’s approach
of working closely with market-leading OEMs, in addition to their direct licensees—the semi-
conductor companies like TI. With an ARM chip running in the background, the OEMs could use
their own proprietary technologies on top of the ARM platform to make their end product (such
as a mobile phone) different and more attractive to users. To pull off this balancing act, ARM had
both to understand the technologies and needs of different semiconductor manufacturers and
OEMs and then to find the right trade-off between their competing priorities and demands to
come up with a design that would suit the most important requirements of all. ARM at that time
had 50 employees and £10 million in revenues; £3.5 million chips were endowed with ARM
technology.
The endorsing effect of TI and the growing success of Nokia benefited ARM, attracting
increasing numbers of licensees and fueling an outstanding rate of growth and innovation. After a
decade of expansion, ARM had, by the end of 2001, 65 partners located in Europe, the US and
Asia and about 800 employees.  Four year later it had market capitalization of £1.6 billion and
with ARM chips in an estimated 77% of the embedded RISC processor market. ARM had
become the de facto global standard.
ARM’s new business model distinguishes it from Acorn, but at the same time the technical
standard developed at ARM has a lineage tracing back to its parent. This interplay between
imprinted know-how and the new organizational impetus shaped ARM trajectory in a unique
manner. The spin-out of ARM made it possible for the inherited technology to respond to the
specifications and needs of a new market for low consumption applications, and triggered the
emergence of a novel IP-based business model.
4.4. Lessons from the case evidence
The three windows in table 1 pinpoint the salient elements distilled from the case evidence to
facilitate understanding of the evolutionary process that shaped the genesis of ARM and the
development of its competitive identity. We use these categories to stylize the essential features
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of the parent-progeny metamorphosis, with imprinting and reimprinting being the two ends of
this process and deprinting an intermediate transition phase.
Table 1 here
As is apparent from the figure, key elements alter across phases as elements and behaviors
that emerge as decisive in certain phases disappear from others. For instance,  in the imprinting
phase there was a noticeable lack of reference (to plans or strategies for) setting a global standard
based on partnerships and international agreements. In contrast,  this dimension heads the
strategic agenda during the reimprinting phase. Similarly, none of our sources suggested the
pursuit of a patenting strategy at Acorn.  Acorn did not file a single patent during its existence
while ARM started very quickly to patent as a requisite condition for the sustainability of its
emerging business model. ARM’s ensuing know-how, however, was not just technology-based
but encompassed a whole spectrum of support capabilities. As pointed out by James Urquhart:
“We are not a licensing patent, we are licensing a complete design that works, along with the test
patterns, along with the software that makes it work, along with the ability to persuade customers
that it will work” (personal interview). Elements of this approach were to be seen in Acorn’s
early relationship with VLSI, but were not formalized into routines. Moreover, while imprinting
and reimprinting both rely on the engagement of visionary champions who commit themselves to
a business idea, they are also very dissimilar in terms of prior experience. Champions did not
clearly emerge in the deprinting phase, where the stage is populated by several significant actors
but with no single individual standing out from the group. Though the role of champion remained
important, incumbents changed and the challenge was to select the new champion to pass the
baton to without gaps in the process.
The comparison also reveals a marked difference between Acorn and ARM in the ability
to move from improvisation to routines to capabilities. ARM was very rapid in the way it
encoded learning from experiments with customers into routines and collective practices. These
built on feedback as well as involving deliberate efforts at establishing an IP based business
model. The IP strategy did not emerge fortuitously but as the result of targeted actions and
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deliberate choices informed by an ongoing learning interaction with lead clients. These were
explicitly referred to as “teacher customers” by some of our informants. These clients provide
useful feedback on how to craft highly customized services and at the same time imposed a
rigorous work discipline in terms of timing and relationship management.
The contrast between the companies is marked at the extremes of the continuum while the
intermediary (deprinting) phase consisted of “unlearning” and the preservation of knowledge that
was at risk of being lost. During deprinting constraining practices are relinquished, allowing for a
more accurate matching between prior capabilities and emerging market opportunities. The main
challenge in this phase is to select the most promising know-how and resources that could
otherwise dissipate rapidly. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Acorn turned into a
hotbed for entrepreneurial initiatives as the deprinting phase frees slack and opportunities for the
progeny to take up and pursue.
The reimprinting suggests a radical change in capabilities’ development. The capabilities
previously developed in Acorn underwent a fundamental renewal on the basis of multiple
enabling conditions. These included the contribution of expertise from external consultants who
trained the internal team in new marketing and customer relation practices; the arrival of Saxby
as new CEO, with his distinctive background and strategic orientation; the learning approach to
clients and clients’ customers, providing ongoing feedbacks on how to customize and improve
the technology. These were combined by means of rapid internalization and sharing of know-how
throughout the organizations. So, as one of ARM founders explained to us, ARM’s emerging
capabilities were being nurtured by an “incredible intelligence machine” tapping a large amount
of information and competencies through his numerous partnerships with clients:
ARM, when it’s operating properly, should be able to assimilate information about what’s happening
in the market much more quickly than most companies because bizarrely, it will work with hundreds
of competitors […] not competitors to ARM, but competitors to each other and with their customers
so (ARM) has an incredible intelligence machine.
5. Theorizing Interorganizational Learning and Spin-off Entry
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Consistent with prior theory on organizational imprinting and parent-progeny transfer, the case
illustrates the way ARM inherited important blueprints and cultural elements originated in the
parent company. These elements provided the basic template for the new company’s learning
process, guiding early patterns of organizing. Yet, in the light of the evidence assembled, it was
also evident that a refinement of the simple notion of imprinting was required. We saw, for
instance, that it was not only the company of origin that provided strong influences. Key
individuals coming from outside were a critical influence and brought with them ways of
organizing with which they were familiar from their own prior organizational experience. At the
same time the feedbacks from the environment proved learning cues that contributed crucially to
steering the spin-out’s strategic direction. The intertwining of the imprinted past and the
emerging path we called deprinting. During deprinting, we conjectured that the progeny
undergoes an unlearning-retaining tension (somewhat akin to Kurt Lewin’s (1947)
psychoanalytic concept of unfreezing). Some elements from the inherited past are selected and
retained, others are dropped and substituted for or transformed. Inherited blueprints are subject to
skeptical scrutiny and revision based on critical appraisal of parent’s mistakes as well as novel
signals from learning trials.
In particular, the case evidence showed how it was that emerging learning opportunities
were essential to explaining what occurred.  The reason why critical reappraisal proved possible
was in no small part the outcome of influences from prior failures at Acorn which provided
potent learning stimuli to avoid potential threats and embark on a winning track. By building on
selected expertise, while diverging from the parent’s strategic pattern, ARM developed an
idiosyncratic combination of resources which mapped better onto the selection criteria of the new
market for low power consumption processor architectures. This process in turn paved the way
for the reimprinting phase, when the spin-off set out on a new trajectory as a result of the
combination of retained know-how and development of new capabilities and organizational
routines in response to market feedback and successful improvisation. Taken together the three
phases of imprinting-deprinting-reimprinting offer a perspective on interorganizational learning
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and emergence that highlights the benefits of focusing on the parent-progeny dyad as the relevant
unit of analysis. Based on our findings figure 2 provides an enriched stylization of our initial
conceptual model of parent-progeny transfer and spin-off entry.
Figure 2 here
The new model highlights deprinting and reimprinting as additions to the original model. It also
identifies the change of strategic trajectory that characterizes the parent-progeny transition, in
contrast with the continuity implied by previous theory. Below we summarize the main
theoretical insights that can be drawn from this revised model.
5.1. Deprinting
The literature on imprinting suggests a highly determinist model of parent-progeny influence and
spin-off entry. Based on our evidence we argue that the risk with this way of portraying the
parent-progeny relationship is that it overlooks the possibility that the inherited practices may be
subject to critical reappraisal and revision by reflexive agents in the spin-off organization. Such a
possibility seems especially plausible in those situations where the parent has experienced severe
failures or crises that may serve as signals or lessons for the progeny on what to retain and what
discard from the past. This may be less true in the case of successful parents since previous
successes are more likely to enable self reinforcing dynamics and sustain past practices
(Levinthal and March, 1993; McGrath, 1999), But, not uncommonly, spin-offs arise out of
disagreements and crises that provide initial impetus to the spawning event. Evidence also
indicates that successful spin-offs sometimes originate from failing incumbents.
Negative outcomes and critical events represent powerful learning stimuli, not only for
gaining confidence and knowledge, but also in terms of reflecting on the consequences of one’s
actions and actively trying to ensure that such events do not reoccur in the future (Cope, 2001).
As Smilor (1997) states, entrepreneurs “learn from what works and, more importantly, from what
doesn’t work” (p. 344). Not all failures however are equally adept at enabling constructive
learning. Sitkin (1992) refers to failures that foster learning as “intelligent failures”; these are
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failures that provide a basis for altering future behavior through new information. These failures
are of sufficiently large scale to attract attention yet not such as to bring about radically negative
outcomes (firm exit, etc.). “Intelligent failures” can promote willingness to take risks and foster
resilience-enhancing experimentation (Lounamaa and March, 1978). Progeny whose parents have
experienced failures or near-failures have therefore an opportunity to critically reflect upon their
failures, unlearn faulty practices and address uncertainties that could be disregarded by progeny
of successful parents.  This impetus stimulates reflexive agents to engage in exploratory search
for new possibilities. Thus, learning through experimentation and bricolage (Baker et al., 2003)
becomes a central learning technique (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sitkin, 1992). In this respect, the
protracted learning efforts of ARM with its partners, the development of new marketing
capabilities almost from scratch, and the many teacher-customer relationships are exemplars. As
a result of this process not only part of the initial, inherited knowledge endowment was selected
through critical revision but new practices were encouraged, that are distinct from the ones to
which the spin-off had been exposed during parental incubation. It is this new orientation built on
inherited practices that we refer to as the process of deprinting.
5.2. Reimprinting
The process of deprinting presents a signal challenge to the new firm that must undergo
considerable learning efforts in order to break with imprinted practices and set on a new
developmental track (Garud and Karnoe, 2001).  To cope with the requirements of the ensuing
trajectory, the spin-off needs to acquire new skills and establish novel routines that  encode
lessons from its search and experimentation. These are critically evaluated, with those yielding
positive feedbacks being reinforced. In such a process, initiatives or traits that are favored by the
business environments are incrementally reinforced in the course of market activity. The
selection unfolds through a process of positive feedback. Positive signals from the market
environment lead to greater commitment of resources which eventually make it increasingly
difficult to return to the critical juncture where the entrepreneurial agents deviated from their
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previous trajectory (Sydow et al. 2005). There are deliberate efforts on the part of managers to
refine and replicate selected traits by means of intentional interventions. As the signals from these
experiments cumulate into consistent patterns they become increasingly codified into routinized
behaviors that provide the basis for the new organizational make-up of the spin-off. ARM’s new
strategic direction was set very early but it was only through ongoing feedback arriving from the
emerging market for low consumption embedded devices that it became a strategic trajectory5.
Thus, the deprinting process paves the way for a gradual metamorphosis that culminates in the
adaptation of the spin-off to the new niche environment and the creation of a new path. We
referred to this process as reimprinting to emphasize the consolidation of the new trajectory. This
occurs through exposure to new external and also internal selection regimes that re-shape its
organizational and technological path in ways that were unforeseeable ex-ante (Garud and
Karnoe, 2001). We suggest that reimprinting occurs in a fashion akin to the biological process of
technological speciation (Adner and Levinthal, 2002; Cattani, 2006). The spin-off develops as
new organizational species that shares a prior lineage with its parent.  It develops radical new
features as a result of its exposure to new selection criteria in the markets where the spin-off’s
core competences are evaluated according to the resource structure of distinctive niches. To the
extent that the resources available in the new niche domain are sufficiently abundant to support
the business efforts associated with the spin-off’s new trajectory, this process may result in a
metamorphosis with dramatic consequences. The re-imprinted spin-off develops a highly
idiosyncratic combination of resources and capabilities with significant strategic potential.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The prevailing tendency to look at the spawning company and the spin-off as two separate
entities obscures the complex interplay of intended and coincidental occurrences that may
                                                 
5 As a similar illustration of such a phenomenon also consider Burgelman’s account of Intel’s shift from memory
business (Burgelaman, 1994). The firm was gradually pulled by market feedbacks and middle managers allocation
resources decisions away from the memory business, engendering a whole new set of routines and practices. Initially
minor efforts were reinforced and ultimately fundamentally altered the organization’s business.
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crucially characterize the transition from one company to the other. Our dyadic focus allowed us
to identify a long span of incubation for ARM technology in Acorn.  The project to develop a
new microprocessor started at Acorn in the early 1980s and the team dedicated to the RISC
technology had ten years to experiment and work with prototypes and to test and improve their
designs for Acorn’s computer products before spinning out. By tracing the spin-off’s
organizational and technological heritage back to its parent company we were able to illuminates
the role of antecedents in incubating a new technology and shaping its trajectory. While this
approach rests on an already robust stream of research that emphasize the effects of spin-offs’
origin on their subsequent survival rate and performance (Agarwal et al., 2004; Cooper and
Gimeno-Gascon, 1992; Klepper, 2001), little attention has been paid to the relationship between a
spin-off’s organizational and technological heritage and the exploitation of its innovative
potential. We have found it essential to focus on dyadic processes and to trace them as they
unfold over time in order to elucidate the evolving nature of the micro processes that shape the
link between the past and the future. The dyadic perspective provides longitudinal depths and
illuminates the interstices between the imprinting-deprinting-reimprinting phases. Had we not
focused on the processes unfolding over a long span of time, Acorn would have been labeled as
case of missed opportunities and failure. At the same time the dyadic focus provides compelling
addition to the understanding of the role of prior experience in shaping new firm formation. It
illustrates the transformation processes that occur in order for this imprinted ‘heritage’ to be
adapted to the needs of the new venture. The transition between imprinted, deprinted and
reimprinted knowledge illuminates the nature of the intergenerational learning processes and
helps explain the intensity of parent-progeny change. Moreover, the examination of two
sequential growth initiatives with strong underlying links reveals nuances and idiosyncratic
elements of each trajectory, which would be difficult to capture on the basis of a generic
comparison. It would be hard to understand ARM, its evolutionary trajectory and its
achievements without knowing its roots in Acorn, at the same time we could not fully appreciate
Acorn and the limitations of its business model – the lack of standard, alliances and marketing
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capabilities – without the enlarged interpretative framework made available by examining the
history of ARM.
ARM was fortunate in gaining appropriate expertise from leading companies; this is not
always the experience of spin-offs.  The case also reveals that it is through the agency of
particular people that learning takes place and is embedded in the new firm’s routines and
business model.  The success of the spin-off rests on the quality of the parent organization but it
also depends on serendipity and individual expertise that drive technological advance.
Figure 1
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Table 1
Imprinting (1979-1985) Deprinting (1985-1990) Reimprinting (1990-)
• Rich scientific environment
• Bricolage capabilities (design
and rapid execution)
• Passion for technical
excellent
• Weak marketing
• R&D discretion and
autonomy
• Resource constrain – less is
more
• Champion
• The new embedded in the old
• Search for a buyer
• Spin out as a emerging
unplanned activity
• Olivetti-Apple-VLSI
• Missed opportunities become
apparent
• Internal slack
• Patents
• Technology Standard
• Partnerships
• Key clients and market
understanding
• Articulated and collective
learning process
• IP business model
• Less is more
• Bricolage (design and rapid
execution)
Figure 2
Initial conditions
imprinting
Imprinting
Parent
Progeny
Persistency in strategic and technological trajectory
Founders’
imprinting
Blueprints
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